The conservative German Historian, Andreas Hillgruber, contended that although Germany in 1919 was no longer a world power it had retained the potential to become one again. Here, he was drawing a comparison with France which had in theory retained its status as a world power in 1919 but was 'de facto' no longer one. Versailles was not a "Carthage Peace" and, while France was to reluctantly accept the limitations of its own power due to a number of factors, but mainly due to their dependence on Anglo-American capital, the question would be, how would the real great powers, Great Britain and the USA, accommodate a resurgent Germany? The instigation of the Dawes Plan in January 1924 and its ratification later that year, followed by the French withdrawal from the Ruhr, was to show the limits of French policy. The Treaty of Locarno in October 1926 was to, albeit, unintentionally provoke German agression. Stresseman was to accept Germany’s Rhine borders in the west but there was no similar guarantee for the Vistula. There was only a vague promise that those borders would not be changed by force. At the end of the day it was to prove insufficient to treat Germany as an equal even to the extent where at Munich in 1938 her war aims of 1914 were achieved without a shot being fired. This was because, ultimately, the economic and strategic interests of the Anglo-Saxons and a Germany that strove for self sufficiency were bound to clash. Germany declaring war on Poland on September 1st 1939 was already inevitable in 1926 for, as history shows us, borders are invariably only changed by force.
The picture above shows German troops crossing over the western Polish border on the 1st September, 1939.
No comments:
Post a Comment